By Dawn's Early Light

China's Moves in Panama

A view of the Pacific entrance to the Panama Canal and location of Panama's next "mega-port".

One of China's major foreign and military policy goals is to establish a firm foothold in Latin America.  Dawn's Early Light posted on this topic last April.  China has a particular interest in the strategic Latin American country of Panama.  While President Bush currently tours Latin America, the subject of a future DEL post, it is important to address China's growing influence in the Western Hemisphere.

Cheat-SeekingMissiles has been posting on China's latest moves to acquire a former US Air Force Base that is being sold by the Panamanian Government (see C-SM "China's Panama Grab Threatens US", "More on Commies At The Canal" and "China Could Use Howard As Air Base").  The Chinese already own a major interest in port operations on the east and west sides of the canal.

Panama has opened bids for a "mega-port" on the Pacific side of the Panama Canal (click on Google Map above) in Farfan.  The port property is likely to fetch $600 million for the land and port rights.

"[Panamanian President Martin] Torrijos met with representatives of China Ocean Shipping Co. (COSCO) of China; Evergreen of Taiwan; the Port Authority of Denmark (APM); Stevedoring Services of America (SSA) of the United States; Hutchison Port Holdings of China; Dragados of Spain; International Transportation Services (ITS), Ports North America Inc. and Marine Terminal Co. (MTC Holdings) of the United States; Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NHK Line) of Japan and PSA International of Singapore.

French, British and UAE companies also have voiced interest in the project according to its director, Rogelio Orillac." 

Two of the bidders on the mega-port are Chinese.  China in the past decade has had a growing interest in increasing its economic involvement in Latin America.  Stephen Johnson of The Heritage Foundation details China's growth [read the whole article for a terrific analysis]:

"In April 2001, Chinese President Jiang Zemin pre­sided over a 12-day mission to cement economic and trade ties, as well as attack what he called Washington’s “unipolar” scheme.[5] His itinerary included Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Cuba, and Venezuela. Li Peng, chairman of the Standing Com­mittee of the People’s National Congress, followed up with more visits in November 2001. In Novem­ber 2004, President Hu Jintao flew to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Cuba, where he signed 39 bilat­eral agreements and announced $100 billion in investments over the next 10 years. In May of this year, Communist Party Chairman Jia Qinglin vis­ited Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, and Cuba.

Building on simple commercial agreements, China has advanced to economic assistance, direct investment, a few joint ventures, and military ties. When Argentina’s financial collapse rippled through South America’s Southern Cone, China quickly seized the chance to increase its stake in Argentina and Brazil, while U.S. investment declined by nearly half. Joint ventures include part­nerships with Great Dragon Telecom in Cuba as well as Colombia. China is partnering with Brazil to improve that country’s railways and establish a rail link to the Pacific to cut transportation costs of iron ore and soybeans. Chile’s congested port at Antofa­gasta may get a facelift thanks to the PRC."

China is interested in potentially widening the Panama Canal to allow for larger Chinese ships to move goods from the Pacific to the Atlantic according to the Washington Times.  President Bush in a recent trip to Panama announced US support for widening the canal as long as every country has "equal access".  With China's large economic role in Panama, it must be considered a serious contender for replacing the US as the principal nation in the Panamanian relationship.

Venezuela's Electronic News, which claims it "remains 100% independent of all political factions" has a thorough analysis of China's economic and especially military ties along with goals in Latin America.  A summary of Chinese involvement in the region:

Economic and Political

• China is working to reduce Taiwanese influence in the world through its economic ties in Latin America. "Of the 26 countries that still recognize Taiwan as a free-standing nation, half are found in Latin America or the Caribbean."
• "It is relevant to note that today China is the third largest manufacturer of automobiles in the world. Therefore, it is not surprising that according to the Washington Post, Beijing has estimated that by 2020 the country would need 600 million tons of crude oil annually."
• "China has displaced the United States as the world’s largest consumer of most industrial raw materials, including copper, aluminum, nickel, platinum and iron ore."
• "In [China's] eagerness to secure access to the Latin American resources it so prizes, the PRC has skillfully wielded its economic 'soft power' to convince regional governments to amicably open up their countries to Chinese penetrations."
• "Chinese private sector direct investment in the region is significant: at $1.04 billion it constitutes more than a third of China’s overall direct investment worldwide. Furthermore, the PRC has approximately $1 billion in investments in Venezuelan oil production, and has promised much more to other countries in the region."
• "In 2004, China pledged $275 million for improvements to Argentina’s infrastructure, and, according to Poder magazine, it also offered Brazil '$8 billion for railways, $6 billion for low cost housing, $5 billion for hydrocarbons, $450 billion for communications, and $260 billion for satellites.'"

Military

• "Chinese economic linkages with Latin America have been paralleled by a certain growth in the military relationship between the two geographical areas."
• "The meteoric deterioration of the quality of US regional engagement during the Otto Reich-Roger Noriega era of ideological supremacy, helped open the door for opportunistic PRC probes throughout the hemisphere. As it advanced its economic aims in Latin America, it also has carefully established active, if low intensity, military relations with the region’s armed forces."
• "China has had only one established direct instance of military linkage with the region as a result of sending 125 riot police to participate in the UN’s Haiti peacekeeping force."
• "Strengthened by cooperation agreements such as those signed between China, Brazil and Venezuela, bilateral military ties are increasing, although they remain minimal."
• "On a 2004 visit to China, Brazilian president Luiz Inacio 'Lula' da Silva sought an 'across the board' consolidation of strategic relations including trade, scientific, cultural and military ties, according to the China Daily newspaper."
• "Between 2003 and 2004, according to the PLA website, there were 15 visits to Latin American countries by PLA officials that were described as 'major military exchanges.'"
• "So far this year, a military delegation has visited Chile and Colombia in September, the director of the PLA’s General Political Department has traveled to Venezuela and Argentina, and 'goodwill visits' were made to Cuba and Mexico."
• "Chile has also established a close relationship which, according to Ellis' report, includes 'attendance by Chilean officers at the National Defense University of China,' and 'Chinese representation at the Chilean War College.'"
• "Venezuela and China also have tightened their military bonds in recent years. In August of 2005, Caracas purchased three military grade radar systems from Beijing."
• "As relations between Venezuela and the US have soured, China seems to have taken advantage, and Beijing could be close to establishing a potential master source to satisfy its oil thirst."
• "Peru and China also maintain active military exchanges, which according to the Peruvian Defense Ministry, are targeted primarily at scientific and technological cooperation. A 1998 agreement sent $1 million in military assistance from China to Peru, and similar accords have since followed."

The Chinese, to grow their economy, require more natural resources than China has domestically.  Securing metals and especially oil is vital to the long-term growth and modernization of the Chinese economy.  China is seeking to obtain these supplies by increasing its good will with Latin American governments that have these resources, while minimizing Taiwan.  Long-term Chinese goals will be to increase military contacts with these same nations to ultimately secure their economic interests.

Panama is yet another example of China's ambitions in Latin America.  The United States should wake up to what is going on in its historic "backyard" before it is too late.  The Chinese, due to their policies, are currently more popular in Latin America than Americans are. 

Other articles of note

1. "Latins seduced, jarred by China-led Asia", The China Post, November 16, 2005
2. "Bush wants Panama Canal Safeguards", Today Online, November 8, 2005
3. "Remarks by President Bush and President Torrijos of Panama", November 7, 2005
4. "Panamanians for Better China Ties", Presna Latina [Cuban State News], October 21, 2005

Bush in Asia: Japan - America's Chief Ally

President Bush visited his good ally and friend Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi yesterday.  The BBC World News reports that Mr. Bush stressed:

Appreciation for Japan's role and support in Afghanistan and Iraq

Praise for Japan for helping spread "democracy and freedom" in Asia

American support for a permanent United Nations Security Council seat for the Japanese

the strength of the US-Japanese Strategic Alliance

President Bush also took the occasion to hint at his position with the Chinese as he gets ready to visit the country after visiting South Korea.  The Financial Times reports:

"Bush cited the communist country as an example of a society that has taken steps toward freedom 'but they have not yet completed the journey.'

He painted a different picture of Taiwan, which China claims. However, Bush reiterated the U.S. 'one-China' policy.

'Modern Taiwan is free and democratic and prosperous. By embracing freedom at all levels, Taiwan has delivered prosperity to its people and created a free and democratic Chinese society,' Bush said in prepared remarks for a speech in Kyoto."

President Bush, while affirming the "One-China" policy, also held out Taiwan as a model of what America would like to see the Chinese economy and political structure emulate.  On the issue of defending Taiwan, the President was adamant, and said he would do "whatever it takes" to defend the Chinese island.  The President did have harsher comments for Myanmar and North Korea.

"Bush had tough words for North Korea and Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, and said that unlike China they had 'not taken even the first steps toward freedom.'

He criticized 'widespread' abuses by the Burmese military, saying they include 'rape, torture, execution and forced relocation.'

Bush cited satellite pictures showing prison camps in North Korea 'the size of whole cities' and said the country’s pursuit of nuclear weapons threatened to destabilise the region."

It is important to note that President Bush is pursuing a policy of exposing the massive human rights violations of these rogue nations. 

China, Taiwan, the US and Chess

Dawn's Early Light attempts to point to well written and thought out pieces by other bloggers online.  Curzon, from the Coming Anarchy, has a truly brilliant post titled "Pinned: America's Taiwan Policy".  Due to the images he uses in structuring his argument, which is a dissenting opinion from his two co-bloggers, I highly recommend you click on the link and read his post.

Curzon takes to task tdaxp hero and global thinker Dr. Thomas P. M. Barnett for his East Asia views. 

I am still mulling over his opinions, but I must say that I think my view of China is much closer to Curzon's than it is Dr. Barnett.  I am curious what Dan over at tdaxp has to say. Dan?

Rumsfeld Goes to China

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld arrives in China today.  His words will be very interesting to watch on three key areas: 1) the massive Chinese military buildup, 2) cross strait relations with Taiwan and 3) six party talks with North Korea.

DEL will follow the Defense Secretary's trip and report on his various speeches and events.  The Washington Post carries and AP story from Robert Burns with some good insight and quotes from Rumsfeld from on board the plane.  Mr. Burns writes:

"Rumsfeld questioned China's motives in underreporting its defense spending. He mentioned no figures, but the Pentagon said last summer that China may be spending $90 billion on defense this year _ three times the announced total. 'I think it's interesting that other countries wonder why they would be increasing their defense effort at the pace they are and yet not acknowledging it. That is as interesting as the fact that it's increasing at the pace it is.'"

"In his remarks to reporters traveling with him from Washington, Rumsfeld said he would not have waited so long to accept China's repeated invitations to visit if not for the April 2001 collision of a Chinese fighter jet and a Navy EP-3 surveillance plane over international waters. The incident infuriated Rumsfeld, who responded by breaking off U.S. military contacts with China for a time."

"The Chinese, however, denied Rumsfeld's request to visit the Western Hills command center, an underground facility that serves as a national military command post. No foreigner is believed to have been inside Western Hills.

Rumsfeld told reporters on Monday that he was not disappointed that he would not see Western Hills. Of his hosts' decision not to permit the visit, he said, "'It tells something about them.'"

Rumsfeld will be meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao and on Wednesday will meet with Gen. Cao Gangchuan and give an address to a Chinese Communist think tank that was formerly run by President Hu.

Chinese Public Comments Prior to Rumsfeld's Arrival

CRI online reports today the following regarding Rumsfeld's visit:

"Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan said Tuesday that China is firmly opposed to all kinds of military exchanges between the United State and Taiwan.

The Chinese government is also firmly opposed to any form of US-Taiwan military cooperation including US arms sales to Taiwan, Kong said.

Replying to questions concerning the visit of US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Kong said that the Taiwan issue is the core in the overall Sino-US relations."

This focus is matched by what the Department of Defense (DoD) reported to Congress in its annual China report (for information from the 2003 and 2004 reports see this DEL post).  From the Executive Summary:

"The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is modernizing its forces, emphasizing preparations to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along China’s periphery. PLA modernization has accelerated since the mid-to-late 1990s in response to central leadership demands to develop military options for Taiwan scenarios.

In the short term, the PRC appears focused on preventing Taiwan independence or trying to compel Taiwan to negotiate a settlement on Beijing’s terms. A second set of objectives includes building counters to third-party, including potential U.S., intervention in cross-Strait crises. PLA preparations, including an expanding force of ballistic missiles (long-range and short-range), cruise missiles, submarines, advanced aircraft, and other modern systems, come against the background of a policy toward Taiwan that espouses 'peaceful reunification.' China has not renounced the use of force, however. Over the long term, if current trends persist, PLA capabilities could pose a credible threat to other modern militaries operating in the region."

These thoughts were echoed in Sec. Rumsfeld's comments in Singapore earlier in June (DEL post here).  I believe the Defense Secretary will push forward US concerns over growing China's military growth and its potential effect in Asia on his visit.  The Secretary will also discuss efforts the two nations can agree on in the War on Terror.  As the American Forces Press Service writes:

"He expressed hope that China will lend its influence and military capability to other constructive efforts as well. 'Certainly we are looking for ways that we can cooperate to a greater extent in the war on terror and other common interests,' he said.

China is already showing strong indications of that cooperation. Immediately following the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States, China offered strong public support for the war on terror and has since been an important partner in U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

China supported U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373, publicly supporting steps to combat international terrorism. It also contributed $150 million of bilateral assistance to Afghan reconstruction following the Taliban's defeat. China also pledged $25 million for Iraq's reconstruction."

While his phrasing will be clear and direct, likely as usual, what the Chinese say and how they say it may be a better indicator of where US-Sino relations are heading.

Update: The UPI is reporting that China announced prior to Sec. Rumsfeld's visit a "white paper" on the "Building of Political Democracy in China".  This white paper seems focused on grass roots areas of democracy, most probably a city-council style approach to democracy for rural and possibly urban areas.

Update 2: tdaxp has a post about the American Arleigh Burke class destroyer, the USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54) performing a goodwill visit in China that overlaps Sec. Rumsfeld's visit.

Kissinger Warns Against Chinese Containment (Part II)

Part II of my review of Dr. Henry Kissinger's piece on "China: Containment Won't Work" will look at his view of US-Sino relations with respect to Taiwan and his prescription for more constructive bilateral relations.

The Problem of Taiwan

"The problem of Taiwan is an exception and is often invoked as a potential trigger. This could happen if either side abandons the restraint that has characterized U.S.-Chinese relations on the subject for over a generation. But it is far from inevitable. Almost all countries -- and all major ones -- have recognized China's claim that Taiwan is part of China. So have seven American presidents of both parties -- none more emphatically than George W. Bush. Both sides have managed the occasional incongruities of this state of affairs with some skill. In 1972 Beijing accepted a visit by President Nixon, even while the United States recognized Taipei as the capital of all of China, and by another president -- Gerald Ford -- under the same ground rules in 1975. Diplomatic relations were not established until 1979. Despite substantial U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, Sino-American relations have steadily improved based on three principles: American recognition of the one-China principle and opposition to an independent Taiwan; China's understanding that the United States requires the solution to be peaceful and is prepared to vindicate that principle; restraint by all parties in not exacerbating tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

The task now is to keep the Taiwan issue in a negotiating framework. The recent visits to Beijing by the heads of two of Taiwan's three major parties may be a forerunner. Talks on reducing the buildup in the Taiwan Strait seem feasible."

Dr. Kissinger outlines several key points.  His first observation is that both the US and China have historically exercised restraint over Taiwan.  While this is true, it must also be viewed in the context of the period of each country's relative power.  During the Cold War, the US Navy, especially in the mid '80s, was rapidly approaching a 600-ship navy.  The world conducted relations in a multi-polar world of two superpowers, one whose remnants border China.  The other consideration is the significant lack of military power that China had at its disposal to project power abroad.  While the Chinese military threat is a hot topic in think tanks, defense ministries and conferences, it was up until recently that Taiwan held a substantial military advantage over China.  China exercised restraint not out of a benevolent power position but out of a weaker position than it now finds itself in. 

This is reflected in the recent "anti-secession" law that authorized "non-peaceful means" to reunify China under the much beloved "One China" policy.  While the past is important, it is vital to examine China's future motives and US goals in Asia before assuming that history will repeat itself for the good.

Dr. Kissinger lays out three requirements for peace over Taiwan:

1. American recognition of the one-China principle and opposition to an independent Taiwan
2. China's understanding that the United States requires the solution to be peaceful and China being prepared to vindicate that principle
3. Restraint by all parties in not exacerbating tensions in the Taiwan Strait

The US has kept to the first position and has reaffirmed, as Dr. Kissinger points out, during 7 US presidencies the One China policy.  China has shown an ability to peacefully integrate Hong Kong; though its slow erosion and reinterpretation of the Basic Law and personal freedoms remains worrisome.  The "Anti-Secession" law, however, does not support point two for the Chinese.  Both sides have not done an exceptional job on point three. Consider the clear message President Bush has given in interviews regarding America's commitment to defend Taiwan against an invasion, Sec. Rumsfeld's speech in Singapore, and continued diplomacy to attempt a Cold War style containment of China.  China's massive military buildup, including up to 1,000 missiles aimed at Taiwan, inviting Taiwanese opposition party candidates to China to divide them politically and provoking legislation, are all steps that are against Mr. Kissinger's third principal.

I agree that it would be beneficial for the three concerned parties to have a frank dialogue and conduct negotiations for reducing the militarization of the Taiwan Strait.  It is possible that Dr. Kissinger is privileged in knowing about discussions that have taken place.  However, it is not publicly known if the US, China and Taiwan are discussing some form of arrangement to reduce tensions.

As China's military power and economic might grow, Taiwan will continue to be an issue.  Additionally, as the anti-Japanese riots demonstrated, the ruling Communist party is not so restrained as to not use nationalism as a foreign policy tool against its neighbor's ambitions, whether they be a UN Security Council seat or independence.  As the middle class grows in China, the demand for personal freedoms and accountability will increase.  Nationalism is the best influencer other than outright reform that the Communist party has to deflect criticism elsewhere and hold fast to power.

Tomorrow, I will examine Dr. Kissinger's views about the balance of power in Asia and whether the US and China will work cooperatively together or move more aggressively into rival positions.

Robert Mayer of Publius Pundit Produces the Smoking Gun

Robert Mayer was extremely kind in hunting down this excellent piece by Willy Lam of the Jamestown Foundation "Beijing's Alarm Over New 'US Encirclement Conspiracy'" reprinted in UCLA's Asia Media.

It would appear to confirm the Dawn's Early Light predictions about the US foreign policy objective of containing China along with India and Japan.

Mr. Lam writes:

"One of Beijing's worst nightmares seems to be coming true. Having apparently steadied the course in the Middle East, the Bush administration is turning to Asia to tame its long-standing 'strategic competitor.' While this particular term has been shelved since 9/11 – and Sino-U.S. relations have improved thanks to China's cooperation with Washington's global anti-terrorist campaign – there are signs at least from Beijing's perspective that Washington is spearheading multi-pronged tactics to contain the fast-rising Asian giant."

As the US makes significant advances in the Greater War on Terror (GWoT), the US foreign policy focus will shift towards creating a democratic China.  A democratic China would significantly benefit the United States regarding North Korea, economic issues, human rights issues and the growing issue of Taiwan independence.

Mr. Lam backs up that the Chinese view themselves as being constrained:

"In the eyes of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership, the new doctrine of encirclement and containment was spelled out during a visit by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Tokyo, part of a recent tour through Asia. Echoing President Bush's State of the Union address [DEL: post on Bush text here, relation to the region here], which pushed a foreign policy predicated upon 'spreading democracy,'  Rice noted in a speech at Sophia University that 'even China must eventually embrace some form of open, genuinely representative government.' And she dropped hints that the U.S. would somehow bring about a democratic China through joint actions with its Asian allies. 'I really do believe the U.S.-Japan relationship [DEL: here, here and here], the U.S.-South Korea relationship, the U.S.-India relationship [DEL: here, here and here] – all are important in creating an environment where China is more likely to play a positive role than a negative role,' she added.

"It didn't help that Rice saluted in her Sophia speech the father of the anti-Soviet containment policy George Kennan – who had just passed away – as one of the 'great architects of American foreign policy.' [DEL: See Rice comments here] Kennan had written in a celebrated 1947 Foreign Affairs piece that 'the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.' The Chinese must be very nervous about the possibility that Rice – and Bush – will simply substitute PRC for USSR. After all, it was Rice who coined the phrase 'strategic competitor' in a 2000 Foreign Affairs [DEL: see page 4] article about the need to adequately take on a fast-emerging China. 'It is important to promote China's internal transition through economic interaction while containing Chinese power and security ambitions,' she wrote."

It is important to remember Sec. of State Rice's background.  She was a Soviet expert.  Her academic understanding of the success of the US containment policy is second to none probably in the Bush Administration.  While one can argue that China is not the Soviet Union, as Simon's World has, I believe the pattern of US foreign policy intentions is increasingly clear.

"The U.S.-Japan statement referred to the looming threat of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and, most irksome for Beijing, it cited for the first time the maintenance of peace in the Taiwan Strait as a 'common strategic objective' of the allies [DEL: covers quote here]. '[The] meeting may mark the end of the extended Beijing-Washington honeymoon which came about because of 9/11,' the source said. 'Even now, of course, Washington requires Chinese help or acquiescence in its dealings with countries, including Iran and North Korea. But Bush seems to have picked up his pre-9/11 agenda of containing China, or at least slowing down its progress toward quasi-superpower status.'  And the Chinese are well aware that Rice, who had advised President George H.W. Bush on ways to sink the Soviet Empire, was instrumental in shaping then-presidential candidate Bush's relatively hostile posture toward China."

Another great contribution Mr. Lam makes to the discussion that I have not addressed is Kyrgyzstan, which shares almost 700 miles of border with China.  Kyrgyzstan is extremely well covered by PuliusPundit (click here for all links).

The Chinese view is that the American containment policy will fail.  I have left off South Korea from the analysis because I believe the government would not be an active player.  It is already quite passive, in my opinion, in its diplomacy with North Korea, a clear and present danger to the South.  However I do believe that Australia would be a natural US ally in the containment strategy, as I have commented prior.

The counter-argument on a US-India and US-Australia alliance is also addressed:

"New Delhi-based People's Daily journalist Ren Yan indicated that 'India will not blindly follow the lead of the U.S.' because the strategic partnership that Washington wanted to forge with the South Asian country was 'centered on American interests.' One purpose of Premier Wen Jiabao's trip to India this month is to consolidate China-Indian cooperation through means including resolving the decades-old border dispute between the two countries. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said Beijing was keen to push Sino-Indian relations to a 'new high.' Analysts said despite the suspicion between the two neighbors – as well as Beijing's warm ties with Islamabad – the CCP leadership is confident that dramatic improvement in ties with India the past few years would at least persuade New Delhi not to become a pawn in America's anti-China machinations.

"Indeed, Beijing is upbeat that China's fast-expanding global clout – and especially the vast China market – has better enabled the country to drive a wedge between the U.S. and quite a few of its traditional allies. Take Australia, which was one of the staunchest supporters of Washington's war against Iraq. Earlier this year, Prime Minister John Howard made it clear that Canberra would not join in the U.S. effort to lobby the European Union to persevere with its embargo on arms exports to China. And last summer, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer indicated that despite the Australia-U.S. joint defense agreement, Canberra could remain neutral if American forces were involved in a war over the Taiwan Strait. Immediately afterward, Singapore, another close friend of the U.S., made known a similar stance of neutrality regarding a possible U.S.-China military conflict over Taiwan."

Mr. Lam concludes:

"Indeed, another unfortunate result of growing tension between Beijing and Washington is that Sino-Japanese relations are fast heading toward a vicious cycle. Given the intensification of the U.S.-Japanese military alliance – as well as joint U.S.-Japan efforts to persuade Brussels to hold on to its anti-China arms embargo – Beijing is close to giving up hope that it could turn around worsening China-Japan ties in the foreseeable future."

It is truly an excellent piece and lays out the arguments much better than this blog has done.  A new diplomatic struggle is being played on in Greater East Asia.  Hopefully it will not be a "vicious cycle".  Nevertheless, US and Chinese foreign policy goals are moving in opposite directions, and either a change in the Chinese government or a humbled America will be required to change it.

Update: The Washington Post carries a Robert Burns AP story today "Rumsfeld Reassured on U.S. Base in Kyrgyzstan": "The acting prime minister, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, discussed the base and other issues with Rumsfeld during a brief stop before Rumsfeld returned to Washington. 'The Kyrgyz republic will comply with all international agreements,' including those with the United States, Bakiyev said during a joint news conference with Rumsfeld."

I imagine Sec. Def. Rumsfeld has more than just the GWoT on his mind in securing the base for future US use.

Winds of Change Challenge (Bringing It All Together)

Joe Katzman of Winds of Change was kind enough to wade through the Dawn's Early Light arguments that the US and India will forge an alliance to counter China.  Mr. Katzman has argued and continues to rationally argue and support reasons why the Indians may pursue more Russian SU-30MKI or the French Mirage 2000 and still take the US up on its offer to propel India into a "21st Century Major World Power". (For a summary of DEL's arguments and key posts on China click here, here, here and here and for India click here, here and here).

In this post, Dawn's Early Light will attempt to:

1. provide a brief summary of the growing Chinese military capability
2. describe the challenge China poses to Taiwan and other affected nations including the US, Japan, India and Australia
3. argue why the US will create strong alliances with India and continue to strengthen its Japanese and Australian security arrangements to avert a war over Taiwan and wait it out for a democratic China.

I.  A Quick History on Chinese Military Capabilities

Before responding, I would like to first point readers to several solid pieces on the US-China-Taiwan-India issue(s) that have been written lately.

From the Blogosphere:

• Redhunter's excellent piece "War with China: 2008-2010?", April 11, 2005.  His analysis believes that China's window to attack Taiwan must occur after the 2008 Olympics (a point DEL failed to consider) but before 2010, when Taiwan and the US could pull well ahead of China's ability to invade.
• Belmont Club's always insightful "Taiwan and China" post from April 13, 2005, discussing the James Dunnigan Strategy Page "out of the blue" attack scenario.  He seems to see it as unlikely because of the US navy's ability to thwart "China's string of pearls" goal of a steady pipeline of oil.
• The Daily Demarche, "Odds and Ends-Corrected", April 11, 2005, with an excellent collection of China links.
• Publius Pundit, "Riots Spreading in China", April 13, 2005 on Chinese nationalism directed at Japan.
• tdaxp argues in "Preventing War with China", April 11, 2005 that a nuclear Taiwan would be a stabilizing force in Asia.
• Between Worlds has a good deal of the cultural attitudes of the "warrior culture" (April 12, 2005) or lack thereof in Taiwan, which could also go for Japan and South Korea as well.

From the Professional Journalists/Analysts

• Jane's Defense Weekly "China: Ready, steady, go ..." (subscription required for full article) argues "An emerging consensus among long-time PLA observers, including within the US intelligence community, is that the Chinese military has successfully achieved a far-reaching qualitative advancement in its warfighting capabilities since the beginning of this decade. The PLA is quickly becoming an increasingly credible threat against Taiwan and could even begin to pose a challenge to US military preponderance in East Asia in the next decade if the momentum is sustained."
• Defense Tech's "China Threat, Round Three", April 13, 2005 (HT: Instapundit)
• Report to Congress "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China", July 28, 2003 which states in its Executive Summary: "While seeing opportunity and benefit in interactions with the United States -- primarily in terms of trade and technology -- Beijing apparently believes that the United States poses a significant long-term challenge.
  In support of its overall national security objectives, China has embarked upon a force modernization program intended to diversify its options for use of force against potential targets such as Taiwan, the South China Sea and border defense, and to complicate United States intervention in a Taiwan Strait conflict. Preparing for a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait is the primary driver for China’s military modernization. While it professes a preference for resolving the Taiwan issue peacefully, Beijing is also seeking credible military options. Should China use force against Taiwan, its primary goal likely would be to compel a quick negotiated solution on terms favorable to Beijing." (Also see key pages 4-10 of 52 total for the Key Developments section of Chinese military improvements)
• Report to Congress "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China", 2004 has several "Lessons Learned" for the PLA from the US success in Iraq, which include:
  • "The PLA is rethinking the concept inferred from Operation ALLIED FORCE that airpower alone is sufficient to prevail in a conflict.
  • The speed of Coalition ground force advances and the role of special forces in OIF have caused PLA theorists to rethink their assumptions about the value of long-range precision strikes, independent of ground forces, in any Taiwan conflict scenario.
  • Other OIF “lessons learned” impacting PLA thinking include the integration of psychological operations with air and rapid ground operations designed to target enemy leadership, its ability to communicate, and its will to fight.
  • Allied weapon system integration/interoperability has reinforced the PLA’s decision to accelerate acquisition of improved information technology and improvements to its weapons mobility, firepower, and precision weapons capabilities.
  • The success of Coalition joint operations has confirmed the PLA’s decision to improve its joint operations capability by developing advanced C4ISR [DEL see here for description] systems and improving inter-service cooperation.
• SinoDefense, "China Seeks Heavylift Aircraft", October 1, 2004 is seeking to purchase An-124 (Condor) heavylift aircraft from Ukraine.  These aircraft, the largest in the world: "can carry 448 troops or 268 paratroops, or 16 pallets of cargos for airdrops, each weighting up to 4.5 tonnes, outperforming any strategic transport aircraft in service with the Western air forces."
• Washington Post, "China Builds a Smaller, Stronger Miliary", April 11, 2005 (summarized by DEL here)

2.  US Interest to Deter China from Invading Taiwan

While the above articles may have some disagreements, they all point to a vastly improving Chinese military that soon will have the capability of being a credible threat to Taiwan.  Just as Japan was able to strike quickly at Pearl Harbor, China may be able to strike quickly against Taiwan, but like Japan circa 1941, China does not have the access to oil and the ability to hold off a militarily superior United States.  Nevertheless, the United States, in its own interests, must deter China from a Taiwan invasion, and it will attempt to do so by pursuing a military and diplomatic front with Japan, India and Australia to severely restrict Chinese options.  As part of this American commitment and continued adherence to the One-China policy that President Bush has publicly supported, Taiwan must do its part to maintain a credible defense and not seek a change in the status quo.

To believe the above, one must first answer "Why does Taiwan matter?" as several readers and bloggers have asked in the comment section of this blog.  I will refer back to my comments on George W. Bush's second inaugural address:

"President Bush's charge and the heart of his message came early:

"We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world."

The speech brought to mind John F. Kennedy's inaugural address when he eloquently said:

"Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty."

While the United States did help promote democracy during the Cold War, it did not do so with the passion and energy our nation needs to now pursue it.  The Cold War was about pragmatic compromises, supporting unsavory dictators as well, especially in the Middle East, to keep countries in the US sphere rather than the Communist sphere. 

In a post Cold War world, where different ideologies dominate the world debate, the old paradigm of working with unsavory nations cannot continue to ensure US security. 

I believe President Bush was not just trying to hold ground and promote his democratic changes in Iraq and Afghanistan, but instead was laying down the gauntlet to totalitarian states:

'All who live in tyranny and hopelessness can know:  The United States will not ignore your oppression or excuse your oppressors. When you stand for your liberty, we will stand with you.... The leaders of governments with long habits of control need to know: To serve your people you must learn to trust them. Start on this journey of progress and justice, and America will walk at your side.'"

If the US fails to defend a democratic Taiwan from China, then it destroys any credibility won in the War on Terror with other nations.  If we fail Taiwan, what is our response to Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, Ukraine, Japan, Australia, our European allies, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and many other nations that depend on American security?

Additionally, allowing China to take Taiwan by force would automatically make the 21st century a Chinese century, as the ability for the US to promote and defend global security would crumble.  Any century that has a non-free government at the apex of the international order will not be a century of peace, economic development and the expansion of liberty.

3.  US Crafting Strategic Alliances with Democracies to Contain Chinese Nationalism

To promote security in Greater East Asia and Australia, the United States has been working during the Bush Administration to forge close diplomatic, economic and strategic ties with important regional and international countries.  The main countries of US interest are Japan, Australia and India.

Japan

Japan's short-term to mid-range goals are to secure a seat on the UN Security Council (which the US supports), which the Chinese government has allowed to become a cause for a national protest that has grown out of control.  Simon has an excellent analysis of the Sino-Japanese tensions:

"The Chinese riots [DEL: against Japan receiving a UNSC seat] also reflect a major domestic political change. The Chinese Communist Party has long ceased to be a party of Communism. It has instead switched to becoming a party of nationalism. It suits to use such occasions as an outlet to allow people to vent. It would much rather that anger is directed externally than people look inwardly and discuss Government failings, such as the riots in Dongyang. The problem is China will find it hard to contain the emotions unleashed and that will be to its detriment.

China and Japan are both rising global powers. They are both grappling with China's economic rise but also with their emergence as global rather than only regional players. Sometimes that requires setting aside self-interest for a broader global good. It's an issue the United States constantly grapples with. This time China has a chance to assume the mantle of world statesman and deal with this situation. It makes good sense for Japan to join the UN Security Council. In the longer term it will be to China's benefit to have Japan there."

While I agree with Simon, I very much doubt the Chinese government feels the same way about the long-term benefits of a Japanese UNSC seat.  For the Chinese, it is a zero sum game, and Japan's gain must be China's loss.  Nationalism is a driving force and a necessary ingredient of the current Chinese government's continued hold on power.

Because of Japan's fears of a rising Chinese dragon, they have extended their military relationship with the US to include defending Taiwan (see DEL here).  If war was to break out in the Taiwanese Strait, the economic engine of Asia and possibly the world would grind to a halt.  It is in Japan's long-term political, national security and economic interests to work with the United States in providing a proper deterrent to China.  It is encouraging that Japan has boldly taken this step.

Australia

Prime Minister John Howard of Australia has proven to be a leader and ally of the United States on par with Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom.  The United States is moving forward with this relationship and is proving to the Australians that their partnership and friendship is important.  While the popular press accords this to the War on Terror, which I agree with, I imagine it also relates to regional issues as well.

Note this little reported (in the US) story of the Bush Administration's treatment of the retiring popular Australian Ambassador Mr. Thawley as reported April 7, 2005 by the Australian:

"George W.Bush just wanted to say goodbye to Mr Thawley, Australia's ambassador to the US, who is due to leave the post in a few weeks.

But the fact that so many of the President's senior cabinet turned up as well indicates Australia's diplomatic punch in the US these days is well above its economic and military weight.

Rarely do ambassadors of any country command this kind of crowd in the Oval Office, but they all turned up for Mr Thawley and his wife Deborah at a private mid-afternoon get-together: Vice-President Dick Cheney, White House chief of staff Andy Card, National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy - and soon to be World Bank president -- Paul Wolfowitz; and the US's top military officer, General Richard Myers."

What is surprising about the neocon guest list is how defense heavy as opposed to State Department heavy it was.  This comes after an important visit by Joint Chief's General Richard Myers' visit to Australia (incidentally, he flew to Mongolia on the same trip, which adds to the containment concept).  Gen. Myers discussed "regional issues and continuing U.S.-Australian projects".  It is likely these regional issues included Taiwan.

Australia, much like Japan, would endure economic issues with any conflict over Taiwan.  In promoting regional security, Australia's interests include increasing "military to military" exchanges and exercises with the US and supporting a "peaceful" resolution to the One-China policy. 

India

India presents the greatest paradigm-shifting opportunity for the United States in Asia and in ultimately deterring China from an invasion of Taiwan.  Dawn's Early Light argued the following on March 25, 2005:

"My guess is that Secretary Rice offered the following [DEL: to the Indian government]:

1. India should purchase the US F-16s (up to 125 aircraft)
2. The US will approve a smaller sale of F-16s to Pakistan, with New Delhi's knowledge
3. The US will offer future, more advanced military hardware including:
   • missile defense
   • nuclear reactor technology
   • high tech programs
   • other advanced US weapon systems
4. The US will engage in a long-term strategic relationship with India to contain China and proactively work to propel India into being a major 21st century world power."

The United States currently has an economy too heavily dependent on Chinese exports.  Shifting a portion of this imbalance over to a democratic India is very much in the US economic interest.  India has an extremely well educated, economically growing society that the US is already increasingly investing in.  Indian companies like Tata (see related The Economist articles here) and others have the ability to and currently do compete on a global scale. 

While a popular Indian worry about any future US arms deal would be the possibility of another arms embargo, as happened with India and Pakistan over the 1996 nuclear testing, this scenario is unlikely to repeat itself because the US strategically needs New Dehli, and New Dehli is not likely to start a war with Pakistan.

While there is strong evidence for US interest in such a partnership, the evidence on the Indian side is equally strong, if not more so. 

• On an economic level, increased trade with the United States would be a great benefit to the Indian economy. 
• The energy needs, specifically the US offer of nuclear technology, would greatly reduce India's need for an oil pipeline running through Pakistan.  The national security implications of this cannot be overstated for India. 
• Providing India with another source of military technology on top of French (EU) and Russian hardware would help make India's armed forces superior to many NATO members. 
• The crown jewel, however, is the US commitment to make India a "major world power in the 21st century". 

While the United States has been rather quiet on its view of an Indian UNSC seat, I believe it is part of the continued discussions and horse-trading between DC and New Dehli.

The most telling anecdotes are in these two recent news items:

1. External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh will meet President Bush and Sec. State Condoleezza Rice this Thursday to discuss greater US-Indo relations and moving forward on the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP).
2. April 12, 2005 Daily Press Briefing: "QUESTION: Just one last thing on that. Have U.S. officials had any discussions with the Indian officials, and especially the Foreign Minister, who is coming here this week, on exactly what might be their concerns about China and China's buildup and then what might be the limit to the India-China relationship?  MR. BOUCHER: I don't know if we've had any discussions in New Delhi in view of the visit that just occurred. I think it just finished. So I'm sure we'll be talking to both sides about how this relationship is going and what they foresee. And as you pointed out, the Secretary does have an opportunity to talk to the Indian Foreign Minister later this week."

The above two items point to the US making an intensive effort at strengthening ties with India.  Secretary Rice's comments after her meeting with Minister Singh will shed more light on India's future direction.  The subject of India and China's recent economic cooperation is also covered in the briefing and mentioned as a potential positive.

I do agree with Mr. Katzman that New Dehli could stiff the American offer on the F-16s (block 70)  or F-18s and still collude with the Americans on strategic regional interests.  However, I believe New Dehli will want to firmly take a step into the American defense market.  Once a sale is concluded, it will open up greater opportunities for more advanced equipment, including naval weapons, missile defense, transport and logistics.  The possibility of purchasing US fighters is not an "end" in itself.  While Dawn's Early Light appears to be in a minority opinion on the consummation of a US sale, I still think it is likely.  With high level talks taking place this week, I imagine the US will conclude a good strategic deal with India for both nations.

Regardless of India's final decision, I believe they will join the US alliance in containing China, for the benefits are many. 

China Constrained

A successful US forging and strengthening of alliances with Japan, Australia and India will severely limit China's mid- to long-term nationalistic goals with consolidating all Chinese into a One China by force.  As Redhunter (above) points out, it is unlikely China would take any steps to repeat the Soviet mistake of invading Afghanistan in 1979 prior to their 1980 Olympic hosting and subsequent Western world boycott.  China has much to show the world in 2008, and they will keep their nationalism in check and continue their strong military buildup, biding their time.  The United States, along with democratic countries in Eastern Asia, have an opportunity to build a constructive alliance to deter China from seeking its goals militarily, but they must act now and wait for an emerging dragon to reform democratically.

While Away - The Economist on India, F-16s, and China

While traveling, I had a better opportunity to read through my most recent issue of the Economist.  Three good articles are worth noting:

1.   An interesting perspective on the failure of China's Taiwan policy in light of the anti-secession bill and how the timing of its passage likely happened:

"China may already be regretting its decision to adopt an anti-secession law aimed at keeping Taiwan in check. For Taiwan's independence-minded president, Chen Shui-bian, it has been a political boost, enabling him to rally hundreds of thousands of people last weekend in one of the island's biggest ever demonstrations. And it has introduced Taiwan—hitherto mainly a problem between China and America—as a tricky new factor in China's relations with the European Union.

Privately, Chinese officials say the bill, which was adopted by China's rubber-stamp parliament on March 14th, arose from the perception last year that Mr Chen was likely to gain control of the legislature in polls last December, dislodging the Kuomintang (KMT) and its pro-unification allies. Mr Chen, the theory went, would then step up his efforts to assert Taiwan's independence. Unexpectedly, the electorate disappointed Mr Chen. But the political momentum in China to adopt a bill threatening war against a secessionist Taiwan proved unstoppable, or so officials now say. They may have hoped that by keeping the law's wording in line with China's existing policy on Taiwan, repercussions abroad would be minimal and that Taiwan itself would sulkily brush it off.

And China probably did not anticipate the bill's impact in the European Union, where its passage is now being cited by some officials as grounds for delaying plans to lift a 16-year-old embargo on weapons sales to China. Shi Yinhong of Renmin University of China in Beijing says relations between China and the European Union, hitherto largely unfettered by the differences over security issues that mar ties between China and America, have suddenly become 'much more complicated'."

2.  "A lollipop for Pakistan; two for India" sums up most of what DEL covers on the F-16 sales to Pakistan here, here and here.  It quotes the US policy of helping "India become a major world power in the 21st century", and sums up all of the US carrots being offered as well.  It concludes with this line:

"Officials deny that the United States has taken a strategic decision to build up India as a counterweight to China. But between the idea of a prosperous, democratic and peaceful Asia, and the reality of American concerns, falls the shadow of Beijing."

3. The final article of note is "Today India, Tomorrow the World" on a wonderful Indian conglomerate success story.  Mr. Rutan Tata, who runs the 80-company conglomerate that bears his name, has an inspiring goal:

"Mr Tata will retire in just under three years, when he reaches 70. Before he goes he wants to launch a revolutionary '1 lakh car'—one that sells for 100,000 rupees ($2,000). Tata would make the body panels and sell kits to small firms that would create jobs assembling the cars in rural workshops. The idea is to have a 'people's car' made by the people. 'When I see four or five members of a family cling to one little scooter, I become determined to provide a low-cost family car between the scooter and normal models,' he says, calling it his parting shot. He may continue as an adviser on the project after he retires."

I hope you enjoy the above articles.  They are all in line with the future of the United States policy in Asia and its support of India over China. 

The Dragon Stumbles

It appears China may have diplomatically over-reached regarding Taiwan and is now suffering the consequences.  The New York Times over the past week has had several good articles looking at China from an economic, military and diplomatic perspective. 

Overstretching Economically

China has been experiencing a tremendous infrastructure expansion that has played a large part in her growth.  Joseph Kahn in the NYT writes:

"The Communications Ministry announced in January that it planned to pave a further 53,000 miles of intercity highways and urban ring roads within 30 years at a cost of $250 billion. Total mileage is expected to overtake the American Interstate system, the world's biggest, around 2020.

The spending has transformed China's landscape, adding roads, bridges, subways and ports - as well as factories, mines, steel mills and power plants - that could provide the foundation for double-digit growth far into the future.

But to an extent that is alarming some Chinese and Western economists, such investment itself is a main driver of China's economy, which grew at a 9.5 percent pace last year. The investment binge, like any bubble, could produce unneeded factories and underused highways and power plants, weakening the country's already shaky financial system.

"If China keeps relying on cheap capital to generate growth, sooner or later it will face a major crisis," said Xu Xiaonian, an economist at the China Europe International Business School in Shanghai. "Right now, the economy is afflicted by the curse of diminishing returns."

The article goes on to suggest that 45% of China's GDP growth is attributable to infrastructure. "Mr. Xu [an economist with the China Europe International Business School] said the economic payoff from these huge investments had fallen sharply. He estimates that 15 years ago, China generated 50 cents of growth for each dollar it invested in fixed assets - roads, subways, and steel mills and the like. That return has fallen to about 20 cents for each dollar invested, he says."  This compares with 15% of the United State's GDP growth coming from similar projects.

China may overproduce, especially because of its centralized economy, and not be able to sustain its current growth rate or utilize all of its existing capacity.  High inflation could become an problem for the Chinese government.  As a side note, China's growth has probably decreased inflation here at home according to The Economist:

"A study by economists at America's Federal Reserve estimates that cheaper imports from China have lowered inflation in America by an annual average of 0.1-0.3 percentage points in recent years. Another study by Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, which allows for the price-reducing effects of Chinese competition on all producers, reckons that China may have brought down America's inflation rate by almost a full percentage point."

China's growth rate was 9.5% for last year.  The Chinese government believes it needs to maintain 7% growth rates to handle the influx of rural labor to urban markets, according to the above NYT article.  However, the US, Japan and South Korea never exceeded the 40% investment in infrastructure.  China could end up shaving half of its economic growth if it reduced its infrastructure spending to reduce over-capacity.  The problem is the Chinese system of government lends itself, from its central planning system and lack of representation, to encourage large, inefficient projects to stimulate growth.  It will be difficult, as it often is with US transportation bills, to slow the pork-style projects.

Overstretching Diplomatically

While North Korea simmers with a crazed dictator bent on expanding his nuclear arsenal and blackmailing all countries within missile range for fuel, food and money, China refuses to publicly step in.  According to Joel Brinkley of the NYT:

"Chinese government leaders have offered Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice no assurances that they will step up pressure on North Korea to return to nuclear disarmament talks, senior officials traveling with her said Monday."

The Chinese diplomatic position is summed up as not having a great deal of influence with North Korea, even though they are their largest trading partner:

"Some local analysts say that Chinese leaders may be more worried about the possibility that the reclusive North Korean regime might suddenly collapse, or that the United States might decide to strike militarily, than they are by the possibility that the North has a small number of so-far untested nuclear warheads.

This leads into a major diplomatic overreach for the Chinese.

The officials said the Chinese repeated the explanation they have often given: that they do not have as much influence with North Korea as is widely believed, an assertion that many American and foreign officials say they discount. But this time, the officials said, the Chinese also expressed their own frustrations with the North Koreans' recent behavior.

The Chinese also urge the United States to offer "flexibility" to North Korea, an official said.  "Flexibility" is regarded as code for offering incentives or concessions to the North Koreans.  South Korea has also offered that view in the past.

If the Chinese want an increasing presence of importance and respect on the international stage, reducing tension on the Korean Peninsula and reining in North Korea is a fundamental test.  The more the US fears for its security because of North Korea, the more involved the US will be in Asian politics and in structuring and strengthening Asian alliances (see DEL here and here for Japan related and here for India related), all of which the Chinese would prefer not to happen.

However, the domestic politics that led to the Chinese Anti-Secession Bill aimed at Taiwan (see DEL here) are now backfiring with China's relations with Europe, which has been bending over backward to expand relations to increase trade.

The United States and the countries of the EU have had a military embargo on selling arms to China since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989.  This has been a stain for the Chinese and it has been a top policy to get the ban lifted.  Jacques Chirac, the happy exporter to undemocratic regimes, has been eager to lift the ban and is supported by the United Kingdom as well as other European nations. 

The bold language of the Anti-Secession Bill that codifies that China has the right to use "non-peaceful means" to unify Taiwan with China gave even the French a bit of heartburn.

Military Overstretch

Joseph Kahn writes again in a different NYT piece titled "Europe's Shift on Embargo Places Taiwan at Center Stage":

"Reports of a shift in European plans to lift an arms embargo on China have sent a sobering message to China's new leadership, underscoring the sensitivity of its Taiwan policy and the continued dominance of the United States, Chinese analysts say.

American and European officials said this week that the European Union might now delay its plan to lift the embargo, imposed after China's crackdown on democracy protests in 1989, until next year at the earliest, dealing a blow to one of China's major foreign policy goals.

European diplomats cited China's newly adopted anti-secession law and intense American opposition to easing restraints on weapons sales to explain the shift. The Chinese law adopted this month threatens military action if Taiwan pursues formal independence from the mainland."

The Chinese rush to codify its right to invade Taiwan will actually reduce the potential for the weapons systems that they will need to counter an American defense.  Fortunately, the US held firm and pushed Europe away from making such a foolish decision when it is America and not the EU (can't this be said for every major global region) that defends the Pacific.  President Bush lobbied the Europeans well on his trip to Europe and Secretary Rice assisted in spreading the message.

"'I think the leadership anticipated that they would get a strong reaction from the parties most directly concerned, like Taiwan and the United States,' said Shi Yinhong, a foreign policy expert in Beijing. "But I'm not so sure they anticipated second- and third-degree reactions, as from Europe. So I think to an extent this comes as a surprise."

Just a few weeks ago, Beijing seemed close to achieving its ambition of removing the embargo, which it views as inappropriate for a country of its rising stature. After persistent Chinese diplomacy, France, Germany, Britain and other European countries all signaled their willingness to remove the embargo by this summer.

But sentiment shifted after President Bush visited Europe in February, where he lobbied against the lifting of the embargo while also backing a highly restrictive code of conduct on arms sales to replace it. Congress has appeared ready to increase the stakes, threatening to punish any European companies that sell arms to China and seek defense business in the United States."

It may only prove a temporary setback as the United Kingdom will give up its presidency of the EU within 6 months, giving France another opportunity to push lifting the ban again.

It has not been a good month for the Chinese on moving their strategic objectives forward.

Losing a Battle to Win a War

Would you be surprised to know that in 2004, the United States Air Force (USAF) lost a major training exercise against the Indian Air Force (IAF)?  I was.  The United States sent one of its most "sophisticated" aircraft, the F-15C to Gwalior Air Force Station, India for joint training February 15-28, 2004. Actually it sent 150 airmen and aircraft from the 3rd Wing out of Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK to train and mock fight against the IAF's Mirage 2000, MiG-21, MiG-27 and SU-30 (though not the SU-30 MKI).  The exercise was named COPE India 2004, and its stated purpose was Dissimilar Air Combat Training (DACT), or simulated combat flying between different types of aircraft (Air Force Link write up here).

COPE INDIA 2004

The exercise, which began its planning period in September 2003, focused on India attacking against a defending United States.

"Following two days of familiarization flights, the F-15s joined the Indian SU-30K Flanker, Mirage 2000, MIG-29 Fulcrum, MIG-27 Flogger and MIG-21 Bison aircraft in a series of offensive counter-air and defensive counter-air engagements.

Each engagement series lasts about 30 minutes over the nearby training range, and two series are scheduled each flying day, said Capt. Mark Snowden, U.S. exercise project officer. During nearly all these simulated combat sorties, the F-15s protect ground targets against advancing Indian aircraft -- the two will swap roles during one series.

Combined pre- and post-flight briefings set the stage and evaluate the scoring for each engagement."

The F-15Cs appear to have lost a majority of the simulated encounters:

"Although service officials have been reluctant to detail how the Indians performed against the six F-15Cs from the 3rd Wing that participated in Cope India, Rep. Duke Cunningham (R-CA) said in a Feb. 26 House Appropriations defense subcommittee hearing that U.S. F-15Cs were defeated more than 90 percent of the time in direct combat exercises against the IAF."

Losing 90% of the time to the Indian Air Force or to any other air force would seem a major problem for the United States in future conflicts and does not support our idea that we retain air supremacy and calls into question even our air superiority.

THE US SETS ITSELF UP TO "LOSE"

However, in researching the exercise in greater detail, I came across some very restrictive parameters the F-15C pilots were "cuffed" with, so to speak.  The cuffs in place were:

1. The scenarios were four versus 12 or a 1 to 3 ratio against the Americans (though this is standard training):

   "Generally the combat scenario was to have four F-15s flying at any time against about 12 Indian aircraft. While the U.S. pilots normally train to four versus 12, that takes into account at least two of the U.S. aircraft having AESA radar and being able to make the first beyond-visual-range shots. For the exercise, both sides restricted long-range shots."

2. The F-15Cs did not have their advanced AESA radars (see quote above)
3. The F-15Cs were not allowed to fire beyond 18-20 nautical miles:

   "The U.S. pilots used no active missiles, and the AIM-120 Amraam capability was limited to a 20-naut.-mi. range while keeping the target illuminated when attacking and 18 naut. mi. when defending, as were all the missiles in the exercise."

4. The IAF used advanced AA-12 Adder missiles that do not require continued pilot control and allow the attacking pilot to fire and fly away:

   "'That's what the Indians wanted to do,' Snowden says. 'That [handicap] really benefits a numerically superior force because you can't whittle away some of their force at long range. They were simulating active missiles [including] AA-12s. ' This means the missile has its own radar transmitter and doesn't depend on the launch aircraft's radar after launch. With the older AA-10 Alamo, the launching fighter has to keep its target illuminated with radar so the U.S. pilots would know when they were being targeted. But with the AA-12, they didn't know if they had been targeted. The Mirage 2000s carried the active Mica missile. Aerospace industry officials said that some of the radars the U.S. pilots encountered, including that of the Mirage 2000s, exhibited different characteristics than those on standard versions of the aircraft."

5. The US flew boilerplate defense formations that were based on having the long range ability and AESA radars:

   "By comparison, the U.S. pilots don't think they offered the Indians any surprises. The initial tactic is to run a wall with all four F-15s up front. That plays well when the long-range missiles and AESA radar are in play.

   'You know we're there and we're not hiding,' Snowden says. 'But we didn't have the beyond-visual-range shot or the numerical advantage. Eventually we were just worn down by the numbers. They were very smart about it. Their goal was to get to a target area, engage the target, and then withdraw without prolonging the fight. If there were a couple of Eagles still alive away from the target area, they would keep them pinned in, get done with the target, and then egress with all their forces.

   'All their aircraft seemed to be capable of breaking out [targets] and shooting at the ranges the exercise allowed,' he says. 'We generally don't train to an active missile threat [like the Mirage's Mica or the AA-12 for the Russian-built aircraft], and that was one of the things that caused us some problems.'"

PUTTING COPE INDIA 2004 INTO A GLOBAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

The USAF and IAF agreed on the rules prior to the exercise, so why did both sides allow an uneven match-up?  The Indian side is obvious.  India beating the United States Air Force looks like an emerging power to its two regional rivals, Pakistan and China. 

However, on a broader political and strategic global level, it was in the United States Air Force's interest to "lose" this competition as well for something far more valuable than bragging rights. 

The Politics of the F-22

On the political side, the war on terrorism has moved Pentagon and Congressional thinking towards fighting insurgencies and non-advanced terrorists on the ground.  This does not look promising for future high-end weapons systems like the F-22.  While the F-22 is a huge improvement over the F-15C, if the US sees its air missions as being supportive of ground troops in the Middle East, it is difficult to argue why scarce defense resources should buy even more sophisticated fighters.  Secretary Rumsfeld often comments on the US needing to skip or "leap frog" a generation of high-end weapons systems to transform the current military away from a Cold War fighting machine to a more mobile, adaptable force.

The USAF needs a reason to buy 756 F-22s, not the lesser 336 number that some on Capitol Hill want.  Any weapons system needs a threat for its existence.  COPE India 2004, with its restrictions, may have been partially designed by the USAF to prove that "threat", that US air superiority is not what Congress thinks it is.  Rep. Duke Cunningham's (R-CA) quote above, who received a classified briefing on COPE India 2004, is the only quoted loss statistic for the exercise in print that I could find.

It turns out Rep. Cunningham is a supporter of the F-22 program.  Rep. Cunningham  in comments on the House floor passionately stated:

"I will tell the gentleman, if he has any idea what it is like to look at tracers coming across the canopy, if he has any idea what is like to see a sidewinder coming up one's tailpipe, if he has got any idea what it feels like to be coming down in a parachute over enemy territory, then he would support the F-22....

Mr. Chairman, if our pilots fly against the SU-27 today, both in the intercept and in the dog fight, our pilots die 90 to 95 percent of the time. But our liberal and socialist friends would tell us the Cold War is over; there is no threat. Our kids are going to die, and it is amendments like this that have stopped our military from surviving and puts us in a situation where we have got 21 ships along pier that cannot be deployed because they are down for maintenance. Our kids are getting worn out, and we are flying 30-year-old equipment."

Rep. Cunningham has a distinguished US Naval Aviator career, serving in Vietnam and in the famous Top Gun school.  He would be a natural ally of fellow pilots for better equipment.  His background would explain, in a non-cynical way, why, in 2002, he was the 4th largest recipient of both Defense Aerospace and Defense Electronics contributions in the US House, according to Open Secrets. (He is lower on the 2004 list).

COPE India 2004, with non-realistic red versus blue drills between the US and India, allowed the USAF to pressure Congress to keep alive the F-22 program.  From a link on the Strait Times of Asia, no longer available but copied on a message board here:

"[S]enior officers have begun leaking information about the exercise, freely admitting their technical inferiority. 'We may not be as far ahead of the rest of the world as we once thought we were,' said General Hal Hornburg, head of the US Air Combat Command.

The reason for the sudden candour has little to do with the F-15, and much more to do with another high-performance aircraft: the US $72 billion F/A-22 Raptor, a new stealthy combat jet the US Air Force is desperate to save from Congressional and Pentagon budget cutters."

From a political analysis in DC politics, the US may have "lost" COPE India 2004 to attempt to promote the F-22 before Congress.  It also doesn't hurt Sec. Rice's attempts to sell F-16s to India (from DEL). [I believe the politcal agenda was not the driving force, but rather, once the strategic perspective described below was taken, the political angle became an added benefit.]

The Strategic Perspective

The strategic global perspective, I believe, is the better framework for viewing the US "loss".  The political aspects for the USAF were not as important as the strategic value of the exercise.

The United States had never flown against the high tech, Russian built SU-30.  This presented the USAF with a treasure trove of intel on its capability over a long exercise.  Why wouldn't the IAF and USAF want an equal balance of attack and defend scenarios instead of the constant IAF attack versus American defense?  Since Pakistan is a primary threat to India, one would think they would be interested in the defense, unless the IAF wanted to convey the message to Pakistan that if it can overwhelm the American F-15C, it can surely overwhelm the Pakistani Air Force.  Sometimes the best deterrence is a good offense.  India also would have conveyed a similar message to China. 

The USAF has been far more on the attacking side of the equation over the past, say, 60 years with aircraft, so why the focus on defense?  It all comes down to defending Taiwan against a Chinese attack.  The ability for the US to train and fly against the SU-30, a massive and sophisticated Russian attack aircraft, for the first time was too good to pass up.  The Indians were reluctant to utilize the aircraft in the scenarios but ultimately decided on it.  The benefits the IAF received were worth giving up valuable intel on a plane that is in India's adversary China's arsenal.

China, over the past 5 years, has purchased 60 SU-30s from Russia and has negotiated transfer of technology arrangements with the Russians worth over $2 billion.  The US had a golden opportunity to witness dissimilar air combat training with aircraft very similar to what the Chinese would employ against Taiwan.  The US used boilerplate tactics to not give away how the pilots of the F-15Cs from their briefing and intel room meetings would really plan a solid defense.  They instead focused on watching the capability, studying it, and preparing for not another exercise, but the real deal.  Someday soon, those pilots may be facing Chinese SU-30s over the Strait of Taiwan defending a new democracy from a Chinese invasion.

It was in our interest to lose COPE India 2004.  It is much like losing a battle to win a war.  The intelligence information was too great to pass up.  It may save a good deal of American lives in the future, well worth losing "bragging rights".

Comments:  I would greatly appreciate USAF, IAF or other commentary on this post.  This is my longest research exercise and feedback would be greatly appreciated, either by email or preferably on the comment section below.

End notes:  Here are the links for this story that were helpful to me if you wish to dive further into it, including very valuable forums that were not quoted above.  (Forums: Military.com, Pakistan Defense and here on a SU-30 crash in China, F-16 Forum, Ibiblio, Above Top Secret, Articles: Su-30MK beats F-15C 'Every Time', Washington Watch Blogs: Lawyers, Guns and Money)

Update:  Bill Roggio (HT: Little Red Blog) over at the Fourth Rail has a very well researched post "The China Syndrome" concerning China's lack of ability to invade Taiwan.

Update 2: DEL Welcomes readers from various areonautical website forums.  A couple of interesting comments are here and here (though I may h