From Bill Roggio's Assignment Desk

Bill Roggio from the Fourth Rail and Winds of Change sent Dawn's Early Light an email suggesting a follow-up post to these DEL entries "US Agrees to Sell F-16s to Pakistan", "DEL Makes A Prediction" and "Supporting Evidence on DEL Prediction?". 

How could DEL not take up the challenge?  Bill was kind enough to include two contradictory articles (one an opinion piece) in the Asia Times Online:

India turns its back on US arms
By Siddharth Srivastava

Delhi missing the point
By Aruni Mukherjee

DEL has taken the position in the above linked posts that Secretary Rice's visit was to cement a new long-term strategic US-Indian alliance to counterbalance growing Chinese hegemony in Asia.  Given India's growing economic power, coupled with its democratic government, something of vital importance to the United States as it readjusts its strategic interests post September 11, 2001, it makes sense the US would be willing to offer substantial rewards to partner with India.  The completion of the canceled sale of US F-16s to Pakistan that was interrupted in 1990 due to Pakistan's nuclear testing is a natural reward from the US to Pakistan for its stalwart support in the Greater War on Terror.  As Aruni Murkherjee argues, this should come as no surprise to India, nor should it tip the balance between New Delhi and Islamabad. 

The India Turns Its Back on US Arms article argues in the opposite direction of the above DEL assessment.  Therefore, we shall start with its arguments first:

"The reaction has been quicker than expected. Peeved at the US decision to supply F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan, India has made it more than apparent that it is not at all happy and will play hard to get in all defense negotiations with the US.  Making India's irritation clear, Delhi has announced new defense orders to Russia, Germany, Italy, Israel and even Qatar, worth a total of US $746 million.

Making no bones about New Delhi's annoyance, even as US Ambassador to India David Mulford has tried to placate matters, Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee announced on Tuesday that the government had cleared the purchase of 12 used Mirage 2000 V fighter aircraft from Qatar and 11 Dornier 228 aircraft from Germany for maritime surveillance, virtually as a gesture set against the US offer to sell PC-3 Orions to India."

The important information in the planned $746 million arms purchase is that the majority of it is going for used military equipment.  DEL argues that the following motivation is behind the recent above announcement:

1. It is for domestic consumption prior to India going ahead and making an even larger order for US F-16s and/or F-18s, plus receiving US support for nuclear energy, missile defense and economic trade benefits
2. It is to maintain existing defense acquisition relationships and expand new ones as India gears up for a large US defense order in line with a strategic realignment of US-Indian relations in Asia
3. The $746 million would likely not be paid out in one current defense budget year, and only represents 5% of 2004-2005 Indian defense spending of US $15 billion (see February 5, 2005 Asia Times article here by same author).  The same article hints at a possible purchase of 126 US F-16s:  "The Indian defense community's wish list is long, which they feel is necessary to modernize the country's armed forces. These include a proposal to purchase F-16 fighter jets, Scorpene submarines and long-range rocket systems. The proposal to buy 126 F-16s - at $25 million each over five years - will itself cost the exchequer $3 billion. "

The Siddharth Srivastava article argues mainly the economic angle for why the US was so motivated to sell the F-16s, namely President George Bush's home state of Texas would receive the financial benefit for 5,000 jobs.

"Prior to the Indian reaction to order arms from other countries, the US decision was also seen as a win-win situation for Washington. For planners in the administration of US President George W Bush, it was a clear instance of geostrategic diplomacy being cloaked to promote the highly competitive business of arms sales, the potential of an arms race in South Asia set aside, as long as it benefited the US arms industry.

There are reports to suggest that the sale to Pakistan may have saved 5,000 jobs at Lockheed Martin, the manufacturer of F-16s, located in Texas, Bush's home state."

Mr. Srivastava goes on to argue that the United States is an unreliable arms seller, which is true if your nation happens to be an irresponsible rogue nation, something the outspoken French seem far less bothered by:

"There is more bad news for the United States. While the US has placed all its cards in the open, there are murmurs of protest in the Indian defense and foreign ministries against any long-term arms arrangement with the US. The US is seen as an unreliable arms partner, unlike the history of such ties with the Russians, the French or even Israel. The main fear is of sanctions, which is built into the entire US system of arms sales, and an arena that is within the comfort zone of US diplomatic arm-twisting. The French, for example, stuck with India even post-1998, when India turned nuclear, despite sanctions by the rest of the Western world."

This is the basis of Mr. Srivastava's argument.  While it is filled with very well-sourced detail of the ins and outs of Indian defense procurement ideas, it does not deal with the larger strategic objectives of both India and the United States that, in a post 9/11 world, are quickly converging. 

Mr. Mukherjee, in his opinion piece, offers a counter view, one that DEL shares.  He takes the Indian government to task for its reactionary attitude:

"On her recent visit to India, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said, "What we're trying to do is break out of the notion that this is a hyphenated relationship somehow, that anything that happens that's good for Pakistan has to be bad for India, and vice versa." [DEL: more on Sec. Rice's comments on the hyphenated relationship here] India's vehement and open opposition to this deal and the dejected expression that followed it will only pour cold water on the country's aspirations not to be equated with Pakistan in most geopolitical discussions pertaining to South Asia. India looks on itself as a rising regional, and possibly global, economic and military power, yet an indifferent attitude to this deal would have gone a longer way to bolster that image than the sniffles of a child who didn't get his cookie. "

He continues why the F-16 sale does little to change the balance and how the US is taking a play from the Russian arms trade book of practices:

"There are reasons to believe that this deal would do little to alter the strategic balance in the subcontinent. First, as a US State Department official put it, India had been contemplating a 'very large' purchase of fighters long before this deal was sanctioned. Models in the race include French Mirage 2000-5s, Swedish JAS-39 Gripens and Russian MiG-29s. Thanks to the recent announcement by the US, India can also add F-16s and F-18s to this list.

Lockheed Martin has also gone a step beyond and confirmed that it will be willing to upgrade the F-16s to Block 70 levels, especially catering to the particular needs of India, very much as the Russians did with the Su-30. Moreover, even without this new purchase, India already operates fighters at par with if not superior to the F-16 Block 52 being offered to Pakistan, the MiG-29, Mirage 2000 and Su-30MKI. It does not appear that a few dozen F-16s will change the entire dimension in favor of Pakistan."

It is likely that India would be able to purchase far more advanced equipment and in greater numbers than the Pakistanis have recently concluded with the US.

The next persuasive argument he makes is a parallel to the US-Soviet cold war arms race that the Soviets couldn't win:

"Second, although India has constantly denied that it wants to get sapped into an arms race, indulging in one would not necessarily be bad for the long-term interests of the country. After all, one of the reasons the Soviet economy never reached the levels of the US was the massive amount it spent on military hardware. India can do the same - draw Pakistan into an arms race by making some big purchases. Owing to nationalist pressures, Islamabad will be forced to do what it can to match India's rapidly growing capabilities. The defense-spending ratio already stands at 5:1 in favor of India - Pakistan would not feel safe to let it slip further.

Once the Pakistani economy was under pressure owing to this race, India could push for economic concessions, such as a South Asian free-trade area, a policy long torpedoed by Pakistan owing to fears of Indian competition. With less money at its disposal to fund infrastructure projects or invest in the economy to create jobs, Pakistan may have no choice but to sign a trade accord and let Indian companies provide jobs to its economy."

Mr. Mukherjee makes a compelling cold war argument shifting the paradigm to Indian-Pakistani relations coupled with an interesting economic interest rationale as well.  He expands on the economic argument and India's own strategic interests:

"Third, India should remember that 'friends are not permanent, interests are'. Pakistan has been favored by the US for the past half a century or so for valid strategic reasons. During the Cold War, it acted as a deterrent to a pro-Soviet India. During the Afghan war, it helped the US and the mujahideen throw the Russians out of the country. After September 11, 2001, President General Pervez Musharraf went out of his way to help in the "war on terror". Even after being exposed to life-threatening attacks by extremists in his country, he has cooperated with the coalition forces in whatever way he can. It is still not clear whether India definitely wants to join the US camp - so why shouldn't the US have an "insurance" partner in Pakistan in the region? It makes sense to the strategists at the Pentagon.

What India needs to do is make itself more attractive as a partner than Pakistan. India's obvious advantage lies in its rapidly growing and very large economy. India needs to liberalize quicker and give foreign firms (especially US firms) incentives to invest in India, beyond software and information-technology services. A preferential trade agreement between the US and India would open up huge avenues for businesses on both sides."

The crux of the argument, and the portion that DEL has articulated prior from the strategic point of view of the US and India vis-a-vis China, is this:

"Once India made its presence felt in the business lobbies in the United States, its weight as an ally would decisively shift vis-a-vis Pakistan. To put things in context, US-India trade in 2003-04 hovered around the US $20 billion figure, compared with a nearly $300 billion figure for US-China trade. The US attitude toward Taiwan has been affected directly as a result. These days the Pentagon often issues restraining calls on Taiwan, and is surprisingly quiet on China's harsh labor regulations since US companies might be affected as a result. A booming bilateral trade between India and the US would not only be beneficial for a large number of Indians, but would also help the country establish itself as a firm US ally in the region, and ensure US support or neutrality in any future disputes with Pakistan."

While Mr. Srivastava has a solid argument built on the detail of different weapon systems and India's just announced $746 million spending spree on used equipment, Mr. Mukherjee grasps the larger, long-term political interests both militarily and economically that will create a diplomatic realignment for both the US and India.  Both nations will seek to keep their current nation state relationships content as exhibited in India's purchase of military equipment, from non-US suppliers, to the Bush Administration's sale of F-16s to Pakistan.  However, their long-term goals coincide, which is to promote democratic India as an political and economic model over the increasingly aggressive and rising Chinese dragon.  The US wants to see India succeed and is willing to offer impressive carrots to India to see it become a counterbalance to China.  It is in India's interests to leave behind Russia and France as suppliers and embrace the United States in a larger framework of economic and military cooperation to become a "21st Century Major World Power".

Update: The WSJ (paid subscription required) has an interesting article that seems to add credence to the DEL position: "The real story here is that the U.S. is steadily building a broad strategic relationship with New Delhi. Said Mr. Mukherjee, 'cooperation in economic and other areas between the United States and India  has increased manifold, but so far there has been no defense agreement between the two states.' One obvious strategic calculation for both countries is countering the military rise of China."

Update 2: Publius Pundit has a great post "Using India to Squeeze Totalitarianism?" that addresses the above concepts and has a great focus on Asian energy needs driving some of the decision making process. (March 31, 2005).  Also Simon's World has a link to a James Town piece "China's Global Strategy for Energy, Security and Diplomacy" that I hope to post on in the next couple of days.  Also Congratulations to Simon making the top 20 list of must read blogs for Publius Pundit! 

For more information and news along with an interesting analysis of the oil needs and strategic implications in China and the Asian subcontinent, please see Quillnews' post "Geo-green puts US in the 'Red'". (March 31, 2005)

Comments

[Simon]

Bill:

I completely disagree with your conclusion. India's history has been one of non-alignment. They are slowly moving towards friendlier ties with the US, but will not give up on such strategic partners such as Russia and France. It's prudent diversification.

At the same time I'm not sure the India as a counterbalance to China idea has legs. India and China are moving closer at the same time but it harks back to my earlier comment: you can't keep framing these things as "goodies" and "baddies". These days there are far more shades of gray and both China and India sit inside the spectrum. In some cases they are rivals, in others they are partners. That balance is titling to the latter and will continue to do so.

I don't see China as "aggressive" in its rise. It will only be so if America (and others) treat it as such.

[Bill Rice]

Simon,

Thanks for your comments. While I respect your opinion and value your input, I do believe that 9/11 was a watershed event for this US administration. Realist objectives powered by an Idealism in foreign policy is the new foreign policy objective of the US. Promoting democracy save all else, or putting legs to JFK's
"Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty."

I do not view it as black and white. However, I do believe that the US is putting its weight and foreign policy objectives behind promoting democractic governments.

I believe the US would like a democratic China and is working diplomatically to those ends. However, China is a rising power both politically and economically. It's interest and US interests coincided during the Cold War to balance against Soviet power in Asia.

Without the Cold War, the US is a long term obstacle to Chinese power. I do believe the Chinese view it as a zero-sum game with the United States.

While we can all hope for peaceful mutual cooperation between the two nations, both countries are setting themselves up for potential future conflict over Taiwan. Neither nation will back down.

Germany and France were each other's two largest trading partners prior to the World Wars. While economics is important, it never trumps "hard power" politics, because nationalism, like any emotion is often stronger than long term logic and patience.

China has something to prove versus the United States desire to defend and promote democracy. They are conflicting goals, just as they were for the Soviet Union and the United States.

When the dust settles on the Greater War on Terror, the US and China will still be left with fundamental differences along with massive militaries with different aims.

I hope and pray for China's move towards democracy prior to a true battle over Taiwan.

Kind regards,

Bill Rice
Dawn's Early Light

[Simon]

We'll have to agree to disagree. China could become a rival, but it could also become a partner. There are few areas of fundamental national interest where America and China conflict with the notable exception of Taiwan.

That said, I also think China will eventually move towards a more democratic system. If that happens will China still appear to be a US rival and threat?

[Bill Rice]

I agree that we will have to agree to disagree, but your opinion and comment is much appreciated. With respect to your final question:

"I also think China will eventually move towards a more democratic system. If that happens will China still appear to be a US rival and threat?"

I would answer that it would no longer be a threat. The United States has not gone to war with any other democracy. I believe that no two democracies to date have declared war on each other. China becoming more like Hong Kong or Taiwan would mean a lessening of tension in Asia and the Pacific and would be a tremendous boom to an already exploding Chinese economy.

Kind regards,

Bill Rice
Dawn's Early Light Blog

[Dan]

Both Bill are Simon are largely right.

Simon is correct that the India will not forget its old friends. That helps world stability. Freedom has real enemies (al Qaeda), real problems (modern terrorism and the economic isolation/stagnation that feeds it), and real worries (China gets dumb over Taiwan). The differences between the US, France, India, and even Russia are nothing compared to that. It does not harm India or the US for India to have other ties.

Simon is right that China is no longer aggressive. Beijing's most controversial acts are demanding that status quo -- that nothing change.

Bill is right about how vital it is to maintain liberalization's forward momentum in China. China is opening up and getting better. Time is on the side of freedom in China.

An aside: if the F-18 sale goes through, it will be a great signal to China. Beijing is not yet at a place where the West is comfortable selling them anything. New Delhi is being offered everything. It certainly shows Beijing the path to modern weapons!

[Bill Roggio]

I have to agree with Dan, both Simon and Bill Rice are correct here. The problem is that China is BOTH a competitor and rival. This is a function of globalization and the opening of free trade. Economically, China is a partner, however geopolitically, China is a rival - mainly over issues like Hong Kong, North Korea and Taiwan.

The move to sell arms to India allows for the establishment of close ties between two influencial democracies, and hedges bets against China. If China moves towards a functional democracy (which I believe is inevitable) then there is no harm is building relations with India. If they remain Communist and become aggressive (Taiwan invasion), then India would also be concerned and the relationship with the United States becomes valuable.

I think it is a mistake to view the arms deal and a closer relationship as aimed only at China. The potential for a NUCLEAR Islamist Pakistan must also be contained, as well as other errant neighbors (fears of of an Islamist Bangldesh come to mind). Strengthening India's military would allow it to exert its own power in the region to contain and destroy Islamists, which they have their own problems (Kashmir and Jammu, Bangladesh). Also, a robust India would allow for it to be used in a UN peacekeeping role, easing the burden on US forces.

India is entering the 21st Century and it is reassessing its prior policies of non-alignment.

[USMC_Vet]

Rogg's got it right, in my view, which I guess means all have a share...now isn't that a little milquetoast?

I have never been comfortable with our 'ally' of neccessity in Pakistan. India has always been a natural ally and it's high time we drop the nuance and geopolitical history and get down to the business of common sense.

That being said, I have always been a big believer of...

Zalmay Khalilzad's "Congage China"

I tend to believe in more containment than engagement, but Khalilzad is essentially on the money.

Ross' The New Chinese Empire is worth the read, though it is entirely likely all here already have.

Cheers.

[Dan]

I'll second Roggio's point. It is important to remember that different problems require different tools. Indian interdiction of enemy planes requires nifty fighters, while squashing insurgencies involves guys with boots, guns, and knowledge of the local language (not always easy in India)!

Hopefully India will focus on both.

[Robert Mayer]

I am SO glad that I'm not the only one who thinks China's democratization is inevitable.

[Nitin]

Hi all,

The US-China equation cannot be completely analysed until you consider the position of Taiwan. If the United States is willing to let go over Taiwan, then China would be less inclined to get into a geostrategic tussle with the United States. That depends on what the Taiwanese people end up doing too.

In the event that the Taiwanese declare independence, or the United States strengthens its committment to the defence of Taiwan, then an adversarial relationship is inevitable. China is well prepared for this scenario --- it has got North Korea to hold down America-Japan-South Korea in north/east Asia; and Pakistan-Myanmar to hold down America-India in south Asia.

That makes it important for the United States to gain a foothold in Central Asia, which, post-Afghanistan seems to be happening.

China turning into a democracy would help change the equation, for that may make a reunification with Taiwan easier. But seriously, how many of you think this is going to happen any time soon?

[Dan]

Renouncing the security agreement, or otherwise abandoning Taiwan, would be a terrible mistake.

# Taiwan and Japan have historically friendly relations. Taiwan and Japan are also both virtual nuclear powers. It does not promote stability to make these nations worry about their security, just as a nuclearized Western Pacific does not serve American interests.
# Taiwan serves to deter China from having a blue-water navy. Japan, extending through Ryukyu, and Taiwan parrellel the Chinese coast for a considerable distance. This should not be sacrificed cheaply.
# When has allowing a dictatorship to grow geographically detered it from further expansion? Abandoning Taiwan would encourage the wrong elements of China's leadership.

China is on the right path, but we must still hedge. For example, what if in 20 years China has a decayed leadership and a flat economy? China is not a nation, and like all Empires it may crumble. If the Chinese leadership were to lose legimitacy, China itself could fall apart. In that situation the world might benefit from promoting seperatism. Allowing China to incorporate Taiwan would make the "peaceful collapse" option much harder.

[Bill Roggio]

Nitin,

I do not see China becoming a democracy in the near or midterm future, I see this in the long term. Also, I wrote a post on US involvement in Central Asia that you might be interested in, called Great Games. I think defending Taiwan plays to our real strengths as long as we have the political will to do so (again, I have to refer to a past post, The China Syndrome, for the reasons why, my apologies). To sum it up: Defending Taiwan would require our air and sea power, our real areas of strength, and we can choke China's oil supply and crush her economy if needed. Granted there is the nuclear variable, but China would be mad to go there.

Dan,

Abondoning Taiwan would be a monumental failure, I agree completely. I think the goal is to hold out on Taiwan until China makes real progress towards democracy. The question is can Taiwanese keep there demands for independence at bay.

[najeeb afridi]

i need a complete assingment on economy of pakistan.thanks