Kissinger Warns Against Chinese Containment (Part I)

Dr. Henry Kissinger, the modern day embodiment of realpolitik, wrote in the Washington Post an article titled "China: Containment Won't Work".  Former Sec. of State Kissinger was the instrument by which the Nixon administration opened the door on relations with Communist China through secret diplomacy in 1971. (For an excellent review of released State Dept. correspondence of the events, see George Washington University's analysis here).

Dr. Kissinger states what many readers of this blog have commented on and what is becoming common wisdom:

"The rise of China -- and of Asia -- will, over the next decades, bring about a substantial reordering of the international system. The center of gravity of world affairs is shifting from the Atlantic, where it was lodged for the past three centuries, to the Pacific. The most rapidly developing countries are in Asia, with a growing means to vindicate their perception of the national interest."

This shift is reinforced by the atrophy of European defense investments and the anemic economic performance of France and Germany.  Asia's growth in defense, trade and investment is in sharp contrast to Europe.  The US, which borders both the Atlantic and Pacific, is geographically well positioned to play a pivotal role in emerging strategic relationships.

Dr. Kissinger, who wrote his doctoral dissertation on the Concert of Europe, focusing on Bismark's elaborate structured diplomacy, writes:

"China's emerging role is often compared to that of imperial Germany at the beginning of the 20th century, the implication being that a strategic confrontation is inevitable and that the United States had best prepare for it. That assumption is as dangerous as it is wrong. The European system of the 19th century assumed that its major powers would, in the end, vindicate their interests by force. Each nation thought that a war would be short and that, at its end, its strategic position would have improved.

Only the reckless could make such calculations in a globalized world of nuclear weapons. War between major powers would be a catastrophe for all participants; there would be no winners; the task of reconstruction would dwarf the causes of the conflict."

While this is the first example I have read of a comparison between US-Sino relations and the Concert of Europe diplomacy, it is an interesting straw man.  Europe, pre-World War I, was a world based on a balance of power, realpolitik structure.  US-Sino-Asian relations is not based on such a system.  US foreign policy is driven, because of the threat of WMD, to an Idealist goal of expanding liberty by realpolitik (Realist) means in an effort to increase our own security. Dr. Kissinger argues against a US policy of containment on the following grounds:

"It is unwise to substitute China for the Soviet Union in our thinking and to apply to it the policy of military containment of the Cold War. The Soviet Union was heir to an imperialist tradition, which, between Peter the Great and the end of World War II, projected Russia from the region around Moscow to the center of Europe. The Chinese state in its present dimensions has existed substantially for 2,000 years. The Russian empire was governed by force; the Chinese empire by cultural conformity with substantial force in the background. At the end of World War II, Russia found itself face to face with weak countries along all its borders and unwisely relied on a policy of occupation and intimidation beyond the long-term capacity of the Russian state."

This argument appears to have has several flaws.  First, the Chinese government has been a Communist regime for the past 60 years, and Communism as a form of government had not existed prior to Marx in the late 1800s.  Linking the current communist regime to 2,000 years of prior Chinese rule seems inconsistent.  But more striking is Dr. Kissinger's failure to point to the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 that left conservatively 400-800 Chinese dead by the ruling government and its military, hardly an argument for "conformity with substantial force in the background."  China has relied on a policy of intimidation with neighbors, including India, Vietnam, Mongolia, Taiwan, and the Philippines, not to mention Tibet, much like his contrasting Russian state.

Next Dr. Kissinger appears to respond to Sec. of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's comments in Singapore questioning the massive increase in Chinese military expenditures when no threat is apparent to the Chinese.

"The strategic equation in Asia is altogether different. U.S. policy in Asia must not mesmerize itself with the Chinese military buildup. There is no doubt that China is increasing its military forces, which were neglected during the first phase of its economic reform. But even at its highest estimate, the Chinese military budget is less than 20 percent of America's; it is barely, if at all, ahead of that of Japan and, of course, much less than the combined military budgets of Japan, India and Russia, all bordering China -- not to speak of Taiwan's military modernization supported by American decisions made in 2001. Russia and India possess nuclear weapons. In a crisis threatening its survival, Japan could quickly acquire them and might do so formally if the North Korean nuclear problem is not solved. When China affirms its cooperative intentions and denies a military challenge, it expresses less a preference than the strategic realities. The challenge China poses for the medium-term future will, in all likelihood, be political and economic, not military."

It is the Secretary of Defense's job to "mesmerize" the Pentagon with the Chinese military buildup because of China's acquisition of weapon systems that are designed for two purposes:  the invasion of Taiwan and the defeat of the US navy in the Pacific.  While the US military budget is structured around the US projecting its power around the globe and defending numerous allies and influencing regions, China's military goals are more focused, regional, and less expensive.  China's potential threat to the United States is greater than what would appear by sizing up the military budgets and concluding China is one-fifth that of America's.   The Chinese have been exceptional students of asymmetrical warfare and strategic modernization of key defense technologies, such as cruise missiles, anti-ship weapons, and sophisticated Russian fighters, along with increased heavy-lift air capability.

While I am a great admirer of Dr. Kissinger, his opening arguments do not appear compelling.  I will look at his comments on Taiwan, North Korea and US foreign policy in my concluding post tomorrow.

UPDATE: (6/16/05) Drudge Report has a link to this Sky News video of how a Chinese protest dispute is broken up by force.  Possibly another example of "cultural conformity"?

Comments

[Andy]

Kissinger notes that China is wary of Japan, India and Russia, as well as the United States. China has fought two of these countries in the last 30 years (or so) and each of them at some point in the past 60 years.

Each of them will factor highly in Chinese military and geo-political strategy and, in my opinion, there is no way that China could or would ever allow its military forces to become significantly unbalanced by focussing on the reclamation of Taiwan.

It is clear that China places a high importance on reclaiming Taiwan, and I'd imagine that it does spend a higher proportion of its military budget on Taiwan related expenditure than it does on military expenditure related to any one of the above countries.

But all the same, even if China spends 30% of its military budget on Taiwan-related expenditure (and actually, given the importance of the other threats China faces I think that figure might even be too high), that is still only 30% of 20% of the US military budget - so about 6% of the overall US military budget.

Even if the US is militarily stretched, I don't think that China's Taiwan focused expenditure compared to America's is enough at the moment to get too het up about just now.

[Bill Rice]

Andy,

You raise some valid points. However, I think the border dispute issues between China and Russia are not likely to flair up again, unless precipated by China and this would likely be foolish.

With respect to Taiwan, China's aim militarily is not to defeat the US, which we all agree it cannot, but to stave off an American naval invasion. By taking Taiwan quickly, before the Americans can respond, China may make the price America has to pay for Taiwan's freedom too high.

China's military budget appears to me very much geared towards holding the US Navy at bay and being able to rapidly project force across the Taiwan Strait.

Kind regards,

Bill Rice
Dawn's Early Light

[Andy]

I'm curious - if you think the Chinese leadership would recognise the foolishness of sparking a conflict with a relatively weak Russia on their Northern border, why do you believe they would be prepared to involve themselves in a far more destructive conflict with the United States, Taiwan and possibly Japan in the Pacific?

[Bill Rice]

Andy,

I think that is an excellent question. My answer to that is two-fold:

1) Taiwan is a part of China and therefore has a strong emotional tie for the Chinese on both sides of the Strait to reunite (how this is done is open to much debate). China doesn't have territorial ambitions in Russia to any degree that compares to its desire to have Taiwan reunited.

2) Russia is a major supplier of arms and technology to China.

The US is the main Chinese rival as far as regional power is concerned. The US, by its economic position, forward base structure and naval presence is the most likely threat to China's ability to be a hegemonic Asian power.

I don't believe that the future is set in stone, meaning that the US and China will collide. However, I am very interested in chronicalling the steps each nation takes with respect to their neighbors in the Pacific and ultimately to each other.

I greatly appreciate your comments and any additional thoughts you have.

Kind regards,

Bill Rice
Dawn's Early Light